Mercer Law Review
Volume 52
Number 2 Lead Articles Edition - A Symposium Brown v. Board of Education: An Exercise in
Advocacy

Article 8

3-2001

Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make Direct Religious
References in Closing Argument
Marcus S. Henson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Henson, Marcus S. (2001) "Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make Direct Religious References in
Closing Argument," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol52/iss2/8

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CASENOTE

Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make
Direct Religious References in Closing
Argument

In Carruthers v. State,1 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the
very "precise line" that must be drawn between religious references that
are permissible and those that must not be allowed in the sentencing
phase of capital cases.2 Specifically, the court held that the prosecutor's
use of direct quotations from the Bible "invoked a higher moral authority
and diverted the jury from the discretion provided to them under state
law."3 The court ultimately found that the allowance of these direct
religious references, over the objection of defense counsel, constituted an
impermissible violation of defendant's right to due process.4
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 12, 1995, Jannette Williams arrived at Anthony
Carruthers' house and took Carruthers and Billy Edward Easter, Jr. to

1.

272 Ga. 306, 528 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, (2000).

2. Id. at 310, 528 S.E.2d at 222.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 311, 528 S.E.2d at 222-23.
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her house in her car. She invited the men into her home and, after
conversing with them for a period of time, she sat on Carruthers' lap.
Carruthers whispered something into her ear, to which Williams
responded that she had a boyfriend. Carruthers proceeded to grab her
arm. At this point, Easter went upstairs to use the bathroom.'
Easter went back downstairs when he heard the sound of breaking
glass. When Easter arrived downstairs, he saw Carruthers choking
Williams. After Williams fell to the floor unconscious or semiconscious,
Carruthers cut her neck with a knife. He commented that the knife was
dull and threw it across the room. When Williams showed signs of life,
Carruthers went to the kitchen, obtained another knife, and cut
Williams' neck in a repetitive motion, nearly decapitating her.
Thereafter, Carruthers
rolled Williams over and stabbed her eleven
6
times in the chest.

Only a short time after the murder, Carruthers' girlfriend saw
Williams' car at Carruthers' residence, noticed his bloody clothes in his
washing machine, and noticed scratches on his neck. Subsequently,
Carruthers and Easter drove to Florida in Williams' car, and Carruthers
sold the car for drugs. Upon discovering that the drugs were fake,
Carruthers chased and possibly shot at a man who had been involved in
the sale. When he returned to Georgia, Carruthers told his girlfriend
that he had killed a woman who owed him money. Shortly thereafter,
on December 20, 1995, Williams' car was found in Florida. Blood was
found in the automobile, and a DNA test matched the blood with
Williams'.'7
On October 2, 1996, a Clayton County grand jury indicted Carruthers
for malice murder, among other charges.' Trial began on March 23,
1998, and on March 27, the jury found Carruthers guilty on all counts.9
Prior to closing arguments in the sentencing phase, Carruthers filed a
motion in limine requesting that during closing arguments the court
exclude "any Bible passages that appealed to the passion of the jury and
would encourage it to impose a death sentence based on religion."' ° A
preargument hearing was held in which the prosecutor made known his
intent to cite passages directly from the biblical books of Romans,

5. Id. at 307, 528 S.E.2d at 220.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 307-08, 528 S.E.2d at 220.
8. Id. at 306-07 n.1, 528 S.E.2d at 220 n.1. Carruthers was also indicted on two
counts of felony murder, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime against the
person of another, theft by taking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of the theft of a motor vehicle. Id.
9. Id. at 307, 528 S.E.2d at 220.
10. Id. at 308, 528 S.E.2d at 221.
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Genesis, and Matthew. Carruthers' counsel objected to the prosecutor's
use of these biblical references. The trial court, however, overruled the
objections and permitted the passages to be used."
In closing arguments, the state focused on the issue of deterrence.
Making direct references to biblical passages, the prosecutor contended
it was imperative that society deter criminals by imposing a death
sentence on those who kill other people.' 2 Specifically, the prosecutor
argued:
Deterrence is very important and the Bible suggests to us why deterrence is appropriate. Romans tells us that every person is subject to
the governing authority, every person is subject. And in Matthew it
tells us, who sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed for
in the image of God made [he] man. For all they who take the sword
is a message that is very clear, that
shall die by the sword, and this
1
society must deter criminals. '
After arguments were heard, on March 29, the jury fixed the
sentence for the malice murder at death. The trial court then
sentenced Carruthers to death. 4
Carruthers filed a motion for a new trial in April and amended
that motion twice before it was denied by the court on February
3, 1999.1'
Following the denial of the motion, this appeal was
brought on June 24, 1999.16

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Georgia Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the
proper scope of closing arguments a number of times. In dealing
with this issue the court has been guided by statutory provisions
These general guiding principles are worth
and precedent.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. In a footnote, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that the passage, "Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he
man," is from the book of Genesis. Id. at 308 n.3, 528 S.E.2d at 221 n.3.
14. Id. at 307 n.1, 528 S.E.2d at 220 n.1. The trial court vacated the felony murder
convictions by operation of law and sentenced Carruthers to consecutive prison sentences
of twenty years for theft by taking a motor vehicle, five years for the possession of a knife
during the commission of a crime against the person of another, and five years for the
possession of a firearm during the commission of the theft of a motor vehicle. Id.
15. Id. The original motion was filed on April 14, 1998, and it was amended on
September 21, 1998, and again on January 19, 1999. Id.
16. Id.
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consideration before a more in depth evaluation of recent
developments is undertaken.
Importantly, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") requires that the Georgia Supreme Court conduct an
independent review of all death sentences. 17 Particularly, with
regard to the issue of the permissible scope of arguments in the
sentencing phase of capital cases, the Code states the court
shall determine "[wihether the sentence of death was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.""
This determination requires a careful review of the
entire record to discover the existence of any unauthorized
factors that might have affected the ultimate decision to impose
a death sentence. 19 Undoubtedly, a close examination of the
arguments made by counsel is well within the purview of what is
required by this statute.2 °
In addition to this statutory guidance, the court has been aided
in addressing the general issue of the permissibility of passionate
arguments by reference to a key case from 1983. Grappling with
arguments designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury in a
capital case, the court in Conner v. State2 ' held that "argument
by the prosecutor which 'dramatically appeals' to such legitimate
emotional response is not 'constitutionally intolerable.'" 22
The
court reasoned that the imposition of the death penalty
necessarily involved a certain degree of emotional response and
that it was not, and could never be, "a wholly rational, calculated, or logical process."2 ' While Conner did not deal with direct
references to religious texts, it did permit an appeal to emotion
to play a very broad role.24

17. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(a) (1998).
18. Id. § 17-10-35(c)(1).
19. See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 117, 303 S.E.2d 266, 272-73 (1983).
20. Id. at 118, 303 S.E.2d at 273.

21.

251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983).

22. Id. at 122, 303 S.E.2d at 276.
23. Id. at 121, 303 S.E.2d at 275. This reasoning comes from an extended look at
Justice Stewart's treatment of the purposes of the death penalty and his discussion of the
concept of retribution in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
24. 251 Ga. at 122, 303 S.E.2d at 276. The court made this position obvious, stating,
"We think it is clear that neither the Eighth Amendment nor OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(1) (Code
Ann. § 27-2537) forbids a death penalty based in part on an emotional response to factors
in evidence which implicate valid penological justifications for the imposition of the death
penalty." Id.
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With this guidance, the court has addressed the narrower topic
of religious references in closing arguments of the sentencing
These
phase of capital cases in several important opinions.
that
the
court
together,
opinions tend to show, when analyzed
this
way
of
resolving
uniform
and
structured
has developed a
made
determinaissue. In these opinions, the court consistently
(1) an evaluation of the
tions regarding three key elements:
proper or improper nature of the references that were made; (2)
a consideration of whether a timely objection was raised by
defense counsel; and (3) a consideration of whether the allowance of the references by the trial court constituted reversible
error. Because these determinations were made with regard to
varying religious references that were characterized by the
court in different ways, and because the circumstances under
which the references were made differed from case to case,
these relatively recent opinions provide an important context
within which the Carruthersopinion can be examined.
One type of religious reference that the court has addressed
involved what could be characterized as a response to religiousoriented arguments made by defense counsel. In Todd v. State,25
the court held that responsive religious references were not
improper.2 6 The court conceded that arguments for the imposition of the death penalty based on the defendant's religion
would be improper; however, when a defendant has offered
evidence in mitigation regarding his postarrest church attendance, a prosecutor is permitted to question the "genuineness of
Additionalthe defendant's 'jail-house' religious conversion."27
raise
a timely
failed
to
ly, the majority noted defendant
objection to the references that he later contended were
improper.2" This failure set the standard of review as a determination of whether or not the argument in reasonable probability
changed the result of the trial, rather than a question of
Applying this
whether the argument was objectionable.2"

25. 261 Ga. 766, 410 S.E.2d 725 (1991).
26. Id. at 768 n.2, 410 S.E.2d at 728 n.2.
27. Id. The sincerity of a defendant's claimed rehabilitation can be considered for
sentencing. Id.
28. Id. at 767, 410 S.E.2d at 728.
29. Id. (citing Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 90, 335 S.E.2d 567 (1985), vacated on other
grounds by Ford v. Georgia, 479 U.S. 1075 (1987)).
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standard,
30

the court

did not find

sufficient

[Vol. 52
prejudice

to re-

verse.

Disagreeing with the majority's reasoning in Todd, Justice
Benham wrote a noteworthy dissent addressing, among other
things, the religious references of the prosecutor.31
Characterizing the references as more than simple responses to the
defense's argument, Justice Benham found several arguments
that he considered to be prejudicially improper.
First, the
prosecutor contended the State was entitled to "Old Testament
Retribution."32
Additionally, the prosecutor "disparaged mercy
as a sentencing consideration" with references to the New
Testament and quoted the biblical passage, "[hie who sheddeth
33
the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed."
Justice
Benham reasoned that these arguments, along with other
arguments regarding the enforcement of the "laws of the Bible,"
not only improperly appealed to religious affiliations but also
"urged the jury to apply a law other than that of Georgia as
given to the jury by the trial court."3 4 Furthermore, he contended allowing these arguments constituted a denial of
defendant's right to due process and was a clear violation of the
guidelines in O.C.G.A. section 17-10-35, prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty with passion and prejudice. 35 Though well
reasoned, Justice Benham's dissent did not change the way the
court approached what it characterized as responsive religious
references.
In Crowe v. State,36 the court again held arguments to be
permissible given the context in which they were made.3 7 The
prosecutor contended that "the Bible says that you shall be put
to death if you kill somebody."3'
The court considered these
references in the context of the arguments made by defendant39
in mitigation, which "consisted largely of appeals to religion."
In this context, the court viewed the references made by the

30. Id. at 768, 410 S.E.2d at 728.
31. Id. at 774-78, 410 S.E.2d at 732-35.
32.

Id. at 776, 410 S.E.2d at 733-34 (Benham, J., dissenting).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id., 410 S.E.2d at 734.
Id.
Id.
265 Ga. 582, 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995).
Id. at 593, 458 S.E.2d at 811.
Id.

39. Id. Defendant called as witnesses different ministers and fellow church goers who
testified as to defendant's religious involvement and activities. Id.
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prosecutor as a reasonable means of countering the defense's
contentions and did not consider them to be part of an improper
argument to impose the death penalty based on a religious
The court further noted that defendant failed to
command.40
object to the references in a timely fashion and, on appeal, did
not succeed in showing a reasonable probability that the
Thus, allowing
arguments changed the result of the trial.4 1
42
the arguments did not constitute reversible error.
Not all religious references in closing arguments have been
characterized by the court as responsive. A second major type of
reference the court has considered is an explanatory reference,
as in Christenson v. State.4" There, the prosecutor referred to
retribution as "[wihat we learned in Sunday School as an 'eye for
an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'"44 The court held this type of
religious reference was simply an explanation of the notion of
Unfortunately, the court
retribution and was not improper.45
did not provide an extended analysis of its reasoning.46
The court did provide at least some reasoning for its view on
explanatory religious references in the later case of Hill v.
State.47 The court held that a prosecutor could argue inferences from the evidence, though the inferences might not be those
While the court
the defendant would like to have drawn.48
again recognized the impermissible nature of arguments that
might urge an imposition of the death penalty based on the
religion of the defendant or on the teachings of a particular
religion, the court relied on the reasoning in Conner to support
their decision to allow broad latitude regarding allusions made
Finally, the court noted that, even had the
in arguments.4 9

40. Id. The court considered the references to have been permissible allusions to
"'principles of divine law.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 45-46, 427 S.E.2d 770,
778 (1993)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 261 Ga. 80, 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991).
44. Id. at 89-90, 402 S.E.2d at 50.
45. Id. at 89, 402 S.E.2d at 50.
46. Id. The court did cite to Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985) and
to Conner v.State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983) apparently relying on the reasoning
in Conner that supported a great deal of latitude in closing arguments. Id.
47. 263 Ga. 37, 427 S.E.2d 770 (1993).
48. Id. at 45, 427 S.E.2d at 778.
49. Id. at 46, 427 S.E.2d at 778. "[C]ounsel may 'bring to his use in the discussion of
the case well-established historical facts and may allude to such principles of divine law
relating to transactions of men as may be appropriate to the case.'" Id. at 46-47, 427
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religious references been improper, there was no timely objection made by the defense, and the brevity of the references did
not permit a finding of sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal.5 0
This reasoning with regard to religious references characterized by the court as explanatory in nature was applied again,
even more recently, in Greene v. State.5 In Greene, the court held
"references to principles of divine law related to the penological justifications for the death penalty," including the issues of
retribution and mercy, permissible in light of defendant's
crime.52 Relying on the reasoning set forth in Hill and Conner,
the court noted that, while directly urging the death penalty by
making references to the defendant's religion or to religious
commands would be improper, prosecutors are not prohibited
from making general references to "divine law relating to
transactions of men as may be appropriate to the case." 3
Furthermore, in keeping with precedent, the court addressed the
other key factors.54
The court stated that defendant's failure
to object to the arguments and the insufficient showing that the
arguments, even if improper, changed the result of the trial
were additional reasons for not reversing the sentence.55
Importantly, the court was not unanimous in its reasoning and
treatment of the references in Greene.56
Chief Justice Benham
wrote an important dissent in which he characterized the
prosecutor's references as going beyond explanation.57
Chief
Justice Benham contended the prosecutor "implicitly urge[d] the
jury that certain passages of the Bible, as interpreted by the
Baptist faith, mandate imposition of the death penalty.""
He

S.E.2d at 778 (quoting Conner, 251 Ga. at 122-23, 303 S.E.2d at 276).
50. Id. at 45-46, 427 S.E.2d at 778. The references appeared on approximately one
page of a 49-page argument transcript, and the sufficiency requirement to be satisfied for
reversal was a showing that the improper argument changed the result of the trial. Id.
(citing Todd v. State, 261 Ga. at 768, 410 S.E.2d at 728).
51. 266 Ga. 439, 469 S.E.2d 129, rev'd on othergrounds, 519 U.S. 145 (1996).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 450, 469 S.E.2d at 141.
Id., 469 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 449-50, 469 S.E.2d at 140-41.
Id., 469 S.E.2d at 141.

56. Id. at 452, 469 S.E.2d at 142 (Benham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

57. Id. at 459, 469 S.E.2d at 146.
58. Id. The prosecutor described himself as "a plain old country Baptist," then
proceeded to argue the biblical meaning of retribution and mercy with repeated references
back to defendant. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 146-47.
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urged that neither the reasoning of the court in Hill (explanatory references), nor its rationale from Crowe (responsive references), should be construed as proscribing the court's "ability to
find error in new prosecutorial approaches to religious discourse. "59
Furthermore, in Chief Justice Benham's view, the
failure of the defense to object should not have prevented
reversal in this case because the magnitude of the "improprieties," in reasonable probability, altered the outcome of the
sentencing phase.6 °
Chief Justice Benham's reasoning from Greene offers insight
into the court's approach to yet another serious type of religious reference. In his dissent, Chief Justice Benham characterized the prosecutor's argument as containing direct religious
When the court has
references with language of command.6
characterized arguments as containing these types of direct,
commanding references, it treats these references differently
than
arguments containing responsive and explanatory referenc62
es.
In Hammond v. State,63 another relatively recent opinion, the
court dealt with arguments consisting of religious references
that could be characterized as being of a direct, commanding
nature.'
The prosecutor argued that defendant had not only
violated the law of Georgia, but that defendant had also
The court reasoned that this
violated the "law of God." 65
reference, and other religious references requiring the
imposition of the death penalty, constituted an "inflammatory"
appeal to private beliefs and violated O.C.G.A. section 17-10-30,
in urging a death sentence for all homicides.66 Thus, the court
held these direct, commanding references were improper.67 The
It noted
court did not stop with that determination, though:
defendant's failure to object to the references in a timely
manner and the likelihood that the references did not affect

59. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 147.
60. Id. at 460, 469 S.E.2d at 147.
61. Id. at 459, 469 S.E.2d at 146.
62. See, e.g., Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 452 S.E.2d 745 (1995).
63. 264 Ga. 879, 452 S.E.2d 745 (1995).
64. Id. at 886, 452 S.E.2d at 753.
65. Id. The prosecutor argued, "He violated the law of God. Thou shalt not kill." Id.
66. Id. "OCGA § 17-10-30 provides that only when the jury finds the existence, beyond
a doubt, of at least one specified statutory aggravating circumstance, may the death
penalty be imposed." Id.

67. Id. at 886-87, 452 S.E.2d at 753.

740

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

the outcome.68
Given these factors, the court ultimately held
that even improper religious arguments cannot be grounds for
reversal when there has been no objection to those arguments
and there has not been a sufficient showing that the references
changed the result of the trial.69

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In Carruthers v. State, the court squarely addressed its past
treatment of religious references in closing arguments and set
forth its primary concerns.7 °
The court first noted one serious
problem with direct religious references is that they "inject the
often irrelevant and inflammatory issue of religion into the
sentencing process. " "
Additionally, because many religious
texts and teachings urge a sentence of death for killing, the use
of those arguments can "'diminish the jury's sense of responsibility" and "'imply that another, higher law should be applied in
capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.' 7 2
The court acknowledged allowing brief, passing references,
but contrasted these references with direct references to
particular religious commands for imposing the death penalty,
which the court was unwilling to permit.73
Furthermore, the
court distinguished the mandates of Georgia law from the
mandates of certain religious teachings by noting that Georgia
law provides a jury with the discretion to recommend different
sentences and has strict procedural protections that allow the
imposition of the death penalty only when certain requirements
and circumstances have been shown. 4
Pointing out that it had repeatedly disapproved of the use of
direct biblical and religious quotes urging the imposition of the
death penalty, the court noted the continued use of these
references by prosecutors and the ongoing willingness on the

68. Id.
69. Id. This outcome seems to make it clear that the mere presence of a reference
deemed to be improper does not necessarily warrant reversal. The determination of the
other factors is critical.
70. 272 Ga. 306, 528 S.E.2d 217 (2000).
71. Id. at 309, 528 S.E.2d at 221.
72. Id. (quoting People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992)).
73. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 221-22.
74. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 222. See O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-30 to -31.1 (1998).
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The
part of trial courts to permit these types of arguments.75
between
difference
court did, however, identify a very important
In
Carruthers and past opinions dealing with these issues.76
Carruthers the defendant anticipated the argument that was later
made by the prosecutor and actually filed a motion in limine to
The court explained the significance
exclude the argument.77
of the trial court's denial of this motion by indicating that the
standard for review was no longer an issue of "whether the
improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result
of the trial, but simply whether the argument was objectionable
While the court conceded that it might be
and prejudicial."78
difficult to draw a bright line between references that are
acceptable and those that are not, the prosecutor here directly
quoted religious mandates as requiring a death sentence, and
Ultimately, the court stated that
this was a clear violation. 9
"[1]anguage of command and obligation from80 a source other than
Georgia law should not be presented to a jury."
The court concluded that the denial of defendant's motion to
exclude these improper arguments amounted to a violation of his
due process rights protected by O.C.G.A. section 17-10-35 and by
Also, because these
the state and federal constitutions. 81
violations could not be determined to have been harmless, the
the death sentence and remanded the case for
court reversed
82
resentencing.
Justice Carley wrote separately as the sole dissenter in this
While he concurred with the court's decision to
opinion. 8
affirm Carruthers' convictions, he dissented on the reversal of
Justice Carley argued that the court
the death sentence.8 4
deviated from precedent that had permitted references to
He also responded to the majority's
religious teachings.8 5

75. 272 Ga. at 310, 528 S.E.2d at 222.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. "In citing specific passages, [the prosecutor] invoked a higher moral authority
and diverted the jury from the discretion provided to them under state law." Id.
80. Id. (citing Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989)).
81. Id. at 311, 528 S.E.2d at 222-23.
82. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 223.
83. Id. at 318, 528 S.E.2d at 227 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 318, 528 S.E.2d at 227.
85. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 227-28. Justice Carley pointed to Greene, 266 Ga. at 449, 469
S.E.2d at 140, Conner, 251 Ga. at 122, 303 S.E.2d at 276, and Hill, 263 Ga. at 46, 427
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emphasis on Carruthers' objection at trial by expressing his
understanding that prior rulings indicated a defendant's failure
to object was only an alternative reason for not overturning
He
death sentences that had involved religious references.8 6
argued that the prosecutor's comments were not objectionable
and prejudicial because the prosecutor did not reference the
Bible as a "separate and independent source of authority for
returning a death sentence" and that the comments were made
for "assisting the jury in understanding 'why deterrence is
appropriate.'" 7 Justice Carley further contended that the
subject of deterrence had long been a permissible topic for
argument and that the broad range of discussion generally
allowed in closing arguments should surely authorize an
explanation of deterrence as having its "roots in religious
teachings.""8

IV. IMPLICATIONS

In the years since Christenson89 and leading up to the decision
in Carruthers, the Georgia Supreme Court has approached this
issue in a variety of different ways. Because of this variation, it
is difficult to predict with a high degree of certainty what this
opinion will mean for the determination of whether religious
references in closing argument warrant reversal of a death
sentence.
In spite of this difficulty, however, it would appear that the
issue of a timely objection at trial is a key element to be
considered."0 The court made it very clear that this case was
unlike the previous cases addressing this issue because the
defense counsel in Carruthers filed an anticipatory motion in
limine to exclude any religious references and objected to the
Defendants in
references when they were actually made. 9

S.E.2d at 778, to support his contention that religious references were not prohibited
altogether, but rather only certain direct mandates were circumscribed. Id.
86. Id. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 228.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 320, 528 S.E.2d at 229. "Inthe State's argument, the Bible did not supplant
applicable statutes, but rather explicated those enactments." Id.
89. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
90. 272 Ga. at 310, 528 S.E.2d at 222.
91. Id.
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previous
cases failed to object at trial to the religious referenc92
es.

Given this analysis, it would follow that in future cases, when
religious references have been made by the prosecution and the
defense has unsuccessfully objected to those references, the
court will review the references to determine if they were of an
objectionable and prejudicial nature.
The standard of review
for reversal will not be a determination of whether the
argument
"in reasonable probability changed the result of the
93
trial."

Arguably, the reliability of this prediction is unclear when one
considers Justice Carley's contention that the matter of an
94
objection is simply an alternative reason to be weighed.
However, Justice Carley is by himself in this view, for the
moment.
One would hope his prediction of arbitrary judicial
discretion is not the future treatment to be expected.95
Undoubtedly, the additional reasoning of Justice Carley's
dissent regarding the permissible use of religious references to
explain the "historical and moral underpinnings" of various
statutorily sanctioned punishments will be an issue that the
court must address more directly in the future.96 The court in
Carruthers characterized the references made as direct quotations that constituted an invocation of an authority other than
Georgia law. 9v
By characterizing the comments this way, the
court dealt with the references as impermissible "[1]anguage of
command and obligation" and avoided an analysis of the viability
of the references if viewed as explanatory.9"
The impact the decision in Carruthers will have on future cases
involving religious references is thus difficult to assess, at
least in terms of ultimate outcomes. The court has, however, set
forth some very important factors that will likely be carefully
considered in determining the appropriateness and permissibility
of religious references in closing arguments of capital cases.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 228 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

95. See id. at 321, 528 S.E.2d at 229. "Henceforth, death sentences are subject to
reversal if an emotional argument by the State does not satisfy the sensibilities of a
majority of the Justices on this Court." Id.
96. Id. at 320, 528 S.E.2d at 229.
97. Id. at 310, 528 S.E.2d at 222.
98. Id. Under the reasoning of cases like Greene, this sort of explanatory characterization might well result in the references being held permissible.
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The focus will be on (1) the directness of the references, (2) the
commanding or explanatory nature of the language used in the
references, and (3) the presence or absence of the defense's
When these references appear to
objection to the references.
be direct references, with commanding language and defense
makes an objection at trial, the court will likely find proper
grounds for reversal.
MARcus S. HENSON

